Reproductive Rights as An Essential Element of Somatic Rights: A Theoretical Legal Analysis
Abstract
This article examines reproductive rights as one of the most important structural elements of somatic rights. It argues that the protection of the human body in law cannot be understood only through the categories of physical inviolability or medical consent in a narrow sense. Reproductive rights reveal a broader legal reality: the body is also a sphere of existential choice, moral agency, dignity, and identity. For that reason, reproduction should be analysed not merely as a medical or demographic matter, but as a central dimension of somatic self-determination. The article develops a theoretical account of the relationship between somatic rights and reproductive rights by drawing on bioethics, human rights law, and European jurisprudence. It engages the ideas of John A. Robertson, Rebecca J. Cook, Bernard M. Dickens, Catherine Mills, and other scholars who have shaped the modern understanding of reproductive autonomy. Particular attention is given to the concepts of bodily integrity, procreative liberty, informed consent, reproductive justice, and positive state obligations. The article concludes that reproductive rights constitute not a peripheral branch of personal rights, but one of the clearest legal expressions of somatic autonomy. At the same time, the article argues that a purely choice-based understanding of reproductive freedom is insufficient. A mature theory of somatic rights must integrate dignity, vulnerability, equality, and access to conditions that make meaningful reproductive decision-making possible.