Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons
Joanna J. BrysonCenter for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USAMihailis DiamantisCollege of Law, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USAThomas D. GrantWolfson College and Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
2017en
ABI
Abstract
Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.
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