In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception
Tomer FeketeBrain and Cognition Unit, KU Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, 3000, BelgiumSander Van de CruysBrain and Cognition Unit, KU Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, 3000, BelgiumVebjørn EkrollBrain and Cognition Unit, KU Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, 3000, BelgiumCees van LeeuwenBrain and Cognition Unit, KU Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven, 3000, Belgium
2018en
ABI
Abstract
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.
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Cited by 20 references