The Green Transition Paradox Across Natural Resource-Rich Economies: Evidence from Brazil, Russia, and Uzbekistan
Аннотация
Resource-rich economies face challenges in pursuing green transitions, with empirical evidence suggesting that such transitions are economically unfeasible, despite varying institutional frameworks. Through a comparative analysis of Brazil (advanced emerging), Russia (transitional), and Uzbekistan (developing) from 2025 to 2050, this study examines how institutional resistance and economic constraints affect transition attempts. Using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model enhanced with an institutional resistance multiplier (0.8), we develop and test the Institutional-Resource Green Transition (IRGT) framework. Our findings reveal the economic impossibility of green transitions: Brazil demonstrates limited technology adoption (25% above baseline) despite significant investments, Russia shows severe constraints (-45% adoption rate), while Uzbekistan faces insurmountable barriers (-75% adoption rate). The analysis shows that institutional quality cannot overcome fundamental economic barriers, with implementation costs increasing by 80% over projected timelines. Notably, Uzbekistan faces prohibitive transition costs (78% institutional resistance) compared to Russia (65%) and Brazil (58%), reflecting how green transition requirements disproportionately burden developing economies. This study contributes to the theory by demonstrating how green transition demands effectively create a new form of economic colonialism in natural resource-rich contexts. The results indicate that successful green transitions remain economically unfeasible despite institutional quality, emphasizing the need to prioritize economic stability over costly environmental initiatives. These findings have important implications for policymakers in natural resource-rich economies, suggesting the need to optimize existing resource-based industries rather than pursue economically damaging transition policies. Doi: 10.28991/ESJ-2025-09-02-018 Full Text: PDF