Обзорная статья

Free will without consciousness?

Liad MudrikSchool of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel; Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. Electronic address: [email protected]Inbal Gur ArieSchool of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelYoni Zion AmirSagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelYarden ShirSchool of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelPamela HieronymiDepartment of Philosophy, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USAUri MaozDepartment of Psychology, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Irvine, CA 92618, USA; Anderson School of Management, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA; Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USATimothy O’ConnorDepartment of Philosophy, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47401, USAAaron SchurgerDepartment of Psychology, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Irvine, CA 92618, USA; INSERM U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Neurospin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette 91191, France; Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Direction des Sciences du Vivant, I2BM, NeuroSpin Center, Gif sur Yvette 91191, FranceManuel VargasDepartment of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USATillmann VierkantSchool of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UKWalter Sinnott‐ArmstrongPhilosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Psychology and Neuroscience Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Duke University School of Law, Durham, NC 27708, USAAdina L. RoskiesDepartment of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA

2022en

ABI

Аннотация

Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.

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Идентификаторы

DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005

Цитирования и источники

Цитирований: 2Использованных источников: 0

Показатели — AkademScholar