Studies on Robust Social Influence Mechanisms: Incentives for Efficient Network Routing in Uncertain Settings

Many of today's engineered systems are tightly interconnected with their users, and in many cases, system performance depends greatly on user behavior [1]. As a result, the traditional lines between engineering and the social sciences are becoming increasingly blurred, and analytical tools such as game theory are finding new applications in engineering [2], [3]. It is often insufficient to judge an engineered system on its technical merits alone since strategic user behavior can lead to unpredictable and/or undesirable results [4]. Of particular importance to this article are socially integrated engineering problems in which users' strategic behavior has a significant impact on overall system performance. These types of systems appear in a variety of contexts in theory and practice; transportation networks [5], ride-sharing applications [6], [7], supply-chain management [8], cloud computing [9], and electric power grids [10] are immediate examples. A common problem in these settings is that individual user incentives may not be aligned with the objectives of the central planner. Thus, in addition to the technical challenges of a socially integrated engineering problem, an engineer may need to consider methods of influencing individual user behavior to effect positive change on aggregate system performance [11]. These behavior-influencing mechanisms often take the form of offering users a tradeoff between quality of service and monetary incentive.

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