Behavioral Economics Instruments in Reducing Corruption in Public Administration: Lessons from Singapore, Georgia and Denmark for Uzbekistan
Litsenziya: cc-by
Annotatsiya
Corruption in public administration is conventionally addressed through deterrence: criminal liability, stricter legislation and enforcement. Behavioral economics offers a complementary approach that targets the cognitive and social drivers of misconduct through choice architecture, framing and social norms. This article examines how far behavioral economics instruments can reduce corruption in public administration and what Uzbekistan can learn from foreign practice. Using comparative analysis, doctrinal analysis of national and foreign legal and policy documents, and generalization of foreign experience, the study reviews Singapore, Georgia and Denmark. The findings suggest that behavioral instruments are most effective when combined with credible enforcement, adequate civil-service remuneration and digital infrastructure, rather than used as a substitute for them. Uzbekistan has built an anti-corruption framework since 2017 and expanded e-government services that reduce official discretion, yet its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score declined from 33 in 2023 to 31 in 2025. The article proposes four policy directions: competency-based remuneration, digitalization that minimizes face-to-face contact, norm-oriented education campaigns, and a shift in justice policy from punishment-only to cause-oriented prevention. The comparative analysis confirms that behavioral instruments achieve their greatest effect when embedded within a broader reform package combining credible enforcement, competitive remuneration and transparent digital infrastructure.
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