Peripetien der Erfahrung. Kants „Erfahrungserkenntnis“ und Hegels „Erscheinungen“

It was not until German Idealism that philosophy briefly regained the importance it had in antiquity. This is indicated precisely by the “peripeteia” in the concept of experience. When Kant and Hegel write about experience, they mean quite different things on the other. Kant’s concept of experience is law-like, invariant and rigid. Only for this reason can it form the basis for a critical reflection on the validity of knowledge. However, Hegel’s analysis of object experience “dynamises” Kant’s concept in various ways: firstly, he provides an interpretation of the process of how perception and its contents ultimately become the “play of forces” via the life of things. Secondly, Hegel works out the self-referentiality of the subject in this process of experience. Finally, Hegel shows how the experience of objects refers beyond itself to more complex forms of knowledge. In the chapter “Power and Understanding” of his Phenomenology of Spirit he undertakes a subtle differentiation of what Kant calls “objective cognition” and shows, on the one hand, which process is already necessary in order to grasp a thing even sensually. On the other hand, he analyses the different levels of experience that are already involved in the simple process of perception. The authors analyse this process as a silent dialogue between Kant and Hegel and show why Hegel’s concept of experience can claim to contribute more to the understanding of man than Kant’s.

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